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Introduction	  
In	  Belgium	  and	  in	  The	  Netherlands,	  a	  debate	  is	  developing	  about	  people	  who	  express	  a	  
desire	  to	  end	  their	  lives	  although	  they	  do	  not	  suffer	  from	  an	  incurable,	  life-­‐threatening	  
disease.	  In	  2000,	  a	  court	  in	  Haarlem	  in	  The	  Netherlands	  considered	  the	  case	  of	  86-­‐year-­‐old	  
Edward	  Brongersma	  who	  had	  expressed	  his	  wish	  to	  die	  to	  his	  general	  practitioner,	  Dr	  Philip	  
Sutorius,	  claiming	  that	  death	  had	  ‘forgotten’	  him,	  his	  friends	  and	  relatives	  were	  dead,	  and	  
he	  experienced	  ‘a	  pointless	  and	  empty	  existence’	  (Sheldon	  2000).	  After	  repeated	  requests,	  
Dr	  Sutorius	  euthanized	  his	  insisting	  patient	  and	  was	  then	  put	  on	  trial.	  The	  public	  prosecution	  
recognized	  that	  Dr	  Sutorius	  fulfilled	  all	  the	  legal	  criteria	  but	  one:	  ‘hopeless	  and	  unbearable	  
suffering.’	  Therefore,	  the	  patient’s	  request	  should	  have	  been	  refused.	  The	  court	  did	  not	  
discipline	  Dr	  Sutorius,	  saying	  that	  the	  patient	  was	  obsessed	  with	  his	  ‘physical	  decline’	  and	  
‘hopeless	  existence’	  and	  therefore	  was	  suffering	  ‘hopelessly	  and	  unbearably’.	  A	  spokesman	  
for	  the	  Royal	  Dutch	  Medical	  Association	  reacted	  to	  the	  court	  judgment	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  
definition	  of	  ‘unbearable	  suffering’	  had	  been	  stretched	  too	  far	  and	  that	  ‘what	  is	  new	  is	  that	  
it	  goes	  beyond	  physical	  or	  psychiatric	  illness	  to	  include	  social	  decline’	  (Cohen-­‐Almagor	  
2004).	  The	  then	  Justice	  Minister	  Benk	  Korthals	  said	  that	  being	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  is	  not	  sufficient	  
reason	  for	  euthanasia	  (Sheldon	  2000).	  Since	  then,	  the	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  physicians	  
should	  comply	  with	  euthanasia	  requests	  of	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  has	  been	  widened	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and	  many	  people	  in	  Belgium	  and	  in	  The	  Netherlands	  are	  calling	  for	  the	  law	  to	  be	  expanded	  
in	  order	  to	  include	  similar	  patients	  (Van	  Wijngaarden	  et	  al.	  2014).	  
The	  methodology	  of	  this	  research	  is	  based	  on	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  
supplemented	  by	  communications	  with	  leading	  scholars	  and	  practitioners.	  First,	  concerns	  
are	  raised	  about	  euthanizing	  people	  who	  say	  that	  they	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’.	  Some	  suggestions	  
designed	  to	  improve	  the	  situation	  are	  offered.	  The	  Belgian	  legislators	  and	  medical	  
establishment	  are	  invited	  to	  reflect	  and	  ponder	  so	  as	  to	  prevent	  potential	  abuse.	  
	  
People	  Who	  Are	  ‘Tired	  of	  Living’	  
Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  age-­‐related	  losses,	  inability	  to	  carry	  out	  daily	  activities,	  decreasing	  
sociality,	  lack	  of	  valuable	  relations	  and	  companionship,	  low	  self-­‐esteem,	  self-­‐withdrawal	  
that	  leads	  to	  depressive	  feelings,	  personal	  characteristics	  and	  beliefs	  are	  associated	  with	  
euthanasia	  requests	  (Rurup	  et	  al.	  2005a;	  Rurup	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Van	  Wijngaarden	  et	  al.	  2014,	  
2015).	  Elderly	  people	  face	  the	  diminution	  of	  their	  family	  and	  social	  circles	  as	  they	  withstand	  
life	  hardships	  while	  their	  loved	  ones	  pass	  away.	  Sometimes	  they	  suffer	  a	  string	  of	  
bereavements	  in	  succession.	  	  A	  Belgian	  study	  from	  2013	  showed	  that	  being	  tired	  of	  life	  was	  
a	  relatively	  common	  reason	  for	  physicians	  to	  grant	  euthanasia	  requests.	  In	  declining	  order,	  
the	  most	  important	  reasons	  were	  the	  patient’s	  request	  (88.3%),	  physical	  and/or	  mental	  
suffering	  (87.1%),	  no	  prospect	  of	  improvement	  (77.7%),	  expected	  further	  suffering	  (48.3%),	  
low	  expected	  quality	  of	  life	  (45.1%),	  loss	  of	  dignity	  (52.1%),	  thinking	  that	  life	  should	  not	  be	  
needlessly	  prolonged	  (30.7%),	  being	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  (25.3%),	  family’s	  request	  (23.4%),	  situation	  
was	  unbearable	  for	  the	  family	  (13.8%),	  and	  other	  reasons	  (0.4%)	  (Dierickx	  et	  al.	  2015).	  I	  
have	  dealt	  with	  the	  problematic	  involvement	  of	  the	  family	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  at	  





controversial	  reason	  for	  euthanasia:	  being	  “tired	  of	  life”.	  Such	  cases	  concern	  people	  who	  do	  
not	  suffer	  from	  a	  physical	  or	  medically	  defined	  psychiatric	  disease	  yet	  they	  are	  unhappy	  
with	  their	  lives	  and	  wish	  to	  terminate	  them.	  These	  cases	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  Belgium	  (Calman	  
2004;	  Pike	  2010;	  Withnall	  2014;	  Van	  Wijngaarden	  et	  al.	  2014).	  They	  are,	  however,	  salient	  in	  
Belgium	  and	  in	  The	  Netherlands	  because	  of	  their	  respective	  euthanasia	  laws	  and	  the	  slow	  
process	  by	  which	  both	  societies	  are	  broadening	  the	  situations	  in	  which	  euthanasia	  can	  be	  
considered,	  such	  as	  for	  mental	  suffering	  and	  children.	  Debates	  are	  taking	  place	  concerning	  
people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’,	  psychiatric	  patients	  and	  patients	  with	  dementia.2	  In	  The	  
Netherlands,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  requests	  for	  euthanasia	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  being	  ‘tired	  of	  
life’	  are	  made	  approximately	  400	  times	  a	  year	  (Rurup	  et	  al.	  	  2005a).	  These	  requests	  pose	  a	  
delicate	  moral	  dilemma	  that	  deserves	  close	  consideration.	  According	  to	  the	  Dutch	  
physicians,	  being	  tired	  of	  living	  was	  one	  of	  the	  important	  reasons	  for	  the	  request	  for	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  in	  14%	  of	  patients	  suffering	  from	  cancer	  (282/2056),	  30%	  of	  
patients	  with	  another	  severe	  disease	  (81/271),	  and	  for	  74%	  of	  patients	  who	  had	  no	  severe	  
physical	  or	  psychiatric	  disease	  (45/61)	  (Rurup	  et	  al.	  	  2005a).	  
	  
Euthanizing	  People	  Who	  Are	  ‘Tired	  of	  Life’	  
The	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  defines	  ‘tired’	  as	  ‘In	  need	  of	  sleep	  or	  rest;	  weary’	  or	  
‘Bored	  or	  impatient	  with’.	  People	  who	  are	  tired	  go	  to	  rest,	  rejuvenate,	  collect	  themselves	  
and	  return	  to	  their	  daily	  routine.	  People	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  presumably	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  
rejuvenate,	  collect	  themselves	  and	  return	  to	  their	  daily	  routine.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





In	  2009,	  Amelie	  Van	  Esbeen	  asked	  her	  doctors	  for	  euthanasia	  after	  she	  indicated	  that	  she	  
had	  ceased	  appreciating	  her	  life.	  Her	  physicians	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  she	  was	  suffering	  from	  
a	  ‘serious	  terminal	  illness’	  and	  ‘constant	  and	  unbearable	  pain	  that	  cannot	  be	  relieved’	  as	  the	  
law	  stipulates,	  hence	  they	  refused	  her	  request.	  The	  93-­‐year-­‐old	  woman	  began	  a	  hunger	  
strike	  and	  after	  ten	  days	  a	  different	  physician	  helped	  her	  die.3	  The	  controversial	  case	  re-­‐
launched	  the	  debate	  as	  to	  how	  life	  should	  end;	  about	  quality	  of	  life,	  and	  whether	  such	  
requests	  should	  be	  honoured.	  Wim	  Distelmans,	  who	  heads	  the	  Belgian	  Federal	  Control	  and	  
Evaluation	  Commission	  for	  Euthanasia,	  said	  that	  euthanasia	  can	  only	  be	  performed	  when	  
there	  is	  a	  question	  of	  ‘unbearable	  suffering’	  (‘93-­‐year-­‐old	  Belgian	  Woman	  on	  Hunger	  Strike’	  
2009;	  ‘Belgian	  Woman	  Dead	  after	  Fighting	  for	  Assisted	  Suicide’	  2009;	  ‘Amelie	  Van	  Esbeen	  
est	  décédée	  par	  euthanasia’	  2009;	  ‘Belgian	  Euthanasia,	  Controversy	  Is	  Served	  Again’	  2009;	  
‘Belgian	  Woman,	  93,	  Gets	  the	  Help	  to	  Die	  that	  She	  Wanted’	  2009).	  This	  sounds	  like	  a	  
restrictive	  view	  of	  euthanasia.	  But	  Distelmans	  maintained	  that	  older	  persons	  often	  suffer	  
from	  many	  illnesses:	  poor	  sight,	  poor	  hearing,	  poor	  verbal	  skills	  and	  dependence	  on	  others:4	  
‘Put	  together	  this	  could	  amount	  to	  unbearable	  suffering.	  I	  don't	  believe	  it's	  wrong	  to	  
request	  euthanasia	  in	  such	  situations’	  (‘93-­‐year-­‐old	  Belgian	  Woman	  on	  Hunger	  Strike’	  
2009).5	  Distelmans	  voiced	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  Belgian	  Euthanasia	  Act	  should	  be	  changed	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  her	  comments	  on	  an	  early	  draft	  of	  this	  paper	  (13	  March	  2011),	  Professor	  Sterckx	  noted:	  ‘This	  is	  a	  rogue	  
doctor	  and	  this	  should	  be	  condemned	  and	  many	  have	  done	  so;	  but	  it	  is	  only	  ONE	  case.’	  
4	  One	  referee	  noted	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  euthanasia	  deaths	  for	  ‘multiple	  pathologies’	  in	  Belgium.	  This	  
may	  suggest	  increasing	  euthanasia	  not	  for	  terminal	  illness	  but	  for	  the	  many	  illnesses	  of	  old	  age.	  	  Some	  of	  them	  
are	  conducted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  being	  ‘tired	  of	  life’.	  
5	  Dr	  Keizer	  remarked	  on	  a	  draft	  of	  this	  paper	  that	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  there	  is	  also	  much	  pressure	  to	  outline	  a	  





enable	  seniors	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  to	  be	  able	  to	  request	  euthanasia	  (‘93-­‐year-­‐old	  Belgian	  
Woman	  on	  Hunger	  Strike’	  2009).6	  But	  Distelmans’	  view	  is	  contested.	  Research	  has	  shown	  
that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  physicians	  interpret	  ‘unbearable	  suffering’	  to	  require	  serious	  
physical	  symptoms	  (Van	  Tolet	  al	  2010;	  Pasman	  et	  al	  2009;	  Bolt	  et	  al	  2015).	  
A	  2015	  study	  by	  Bolt	  et	  al	  shows	  that	  3%	  of	  all	  euthanasia	  and	  physician-­‐assisted	  suicide	  
requests	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  are	  from	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  and	  that	  only	  a	  minority	  
of	  physicians	  find	  it	  conceivable	  that	  they	  would	  grant	  such	  a	  request.	  Bolt	  et	  al	  (2015)	  think	  
that	  legal	  arguments	  and	  moral	  objections	  deter	  most	  physicians	  from	  complying	  with	  such	  
requests.	  
In	  2014,	  a	  British	  woman	  who	  was	  neither	  terminally	  ill	  nor	  seriously	  handicapped	  but	  who	  
had	  become	  fed	  up	  with	  the	  modern	  world	  of	  emails,	  TVs,	  computers	  and	  supermarket	  
ready	  meals	  wished	  to	  end	  her	  life.	  As	  no	  physician	  in	  Britain	  would	  help	  her,	  she	  travelled	  




The	  raison	  d'être	  of	  medicine	  and	  health	  care	  is	  to	  relieve	  suffering,	  to	  assist	  patients	  in	  
coping	  with	  their	  particular	  ailments,	  and	  to	  seek	  to	  treat	  or	  heal.	  Physicians	  are	  there	  to	  
serve	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  their	  patients	  on	  matters	  that	  concern	  their	  health.	  Does	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Professor	  Sterckx	  doubted	  that	  Distelmans	  said	  this	  and	  suggested	  to	  check	  with	  him	  whether	  the	  press	  
release	  is	  accurate.	  I	  wrote	  to	  Distelmans	  but	  received	  no	  reply.	  





terminating	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  (I	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  ‘people’	  not	  ‘patients’)	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  
life’	  fall	  within	  this	  raison	  d'être?	  I	  believe	  the	  following	  considerations	  should	  be	  included.	  
	  
Autonomy:	  People	  have	  the	  right	  to	  control	  what	  happens	  to	  their	  bodies.	  The	  central	  idea	  
of	  autonomy	  is	  self-­‐rule,	  or	  self-­‐direction.	  Accordingly,	  the	  view	  is	  that	  individuals	  should	  be	  left	  
to	  govern	  their	  business	  without	  being	  overwhelmingly	  subject	  to	  external	  forces.	  We	  are	  said	  
to	  be	  free	  when	  our	  acts	  are	  not	  dominated	  by	  external	  impediments,	  thus	  enabling	  us	  to	  form	  
judgment,	  to	  decide	  between	  alternatives,	  and	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  action-­‐
commitments	  implied	  by	  our	  beliefs.	  Thus	  autonomy	  means	  that	  an	  informed,	  competent	  
adult	  can	  refuse	  or	  accept	  treatments,	  drugs,	  and	  surgeries	  according	  to	  his	  or	  her	  wishes.	  	  
The	  autonomy	  argument	  is	  weak	  because	  these	  people	  suffer,	  and	  they	  are	  dependent	  on	  
others.	  They	  may	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  autonomous,	  self-­‐determined	  people	  who	  
make	  a	  rational	  choice	  to	  end	  their	  lives	  but	  in	  effect	  their	  self-­‐rule	  is	  impaired.	  They	  are	  
vulnerable,	  needy	  and	  depend	  on	  others,	  including	  their	  doctors.	  Thus	  we	  are	  considering	  a	  
restricted	  sense	  of	  autonomy	  and	  deficient	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐rule.8	  
Furthermore,	  the	  issue	  is	  not	  denying	  individuals	  to	  exercise	  what	  they	  perceive	  as	  their	  
right.	  Granted	  that	  some	  people	  may	  believe	  that	  death	  serves	  their	  best	  interest.	  But	  they	  
do	  not	  commit	  suicide.	  They	  want	  the	  physician	  to	  help	  them.	  Respecting	  the	  autonomy	  of	  
the	  person	  would	  require	  changing	  the	  scope	  of	  medicine	  and	  healthcare	  to	  include	  
providing	  aid-­‐in-­‐dying	  to	  people	  rather	  than	  to	  patients.	  	  	  
Neil	  Calman	  (2004)	  tells	  the	  heart-­‐wrenching	  story	  of	  ‘Sarah	  Brownstein’	  (this	  is	  a	  fictitious	  
name),	  92-­‐year-­‐old	  New	  Yorker	  lady	  of	  sound	  mind	  who	  was	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  and	  asked	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





assistance	  to	  die.	  Sarah	  was	  lonely.	  She	  had	  difficulties	  hearing	  and	  reading.	  She	  had	  
difficulties	  thinking.	  She	  felt	  unworthy,	  of	  no	  use	  to	  anyone,	  not	  even	  to	  herself.	  She	  wanted	  
the	  doctor	  to	  end	  her	  misery.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Sarah’s	  medical	  condition	  was	  stable.	  She	  
lacked	  most	  signs	  of	  depression.	  She	  was	  eating	  and	  sleeping	  well.	  She	  dressed	  up	  and	  put	  
on	  make	  up	  every	  morning.	  She	  also	  obediently	  took	  her	  many	  medications.	  The	  doctor	  
could	  not	  come	  to	  her	  aid	  as	  Sarah	  requested;	  such	  act	  was	  against	  New	  York	  law.	  He	  did	  
tell	  Sarah	  that	  it	  was	  her	  right	  to	  end	  her	  life	  if	  she	  so	  chooses.	  As	  Sarah	  continued	  to	  insist,	  
he	  finally	  told	  her	  she	  can	  stop	  taking	  all	  her	  medication.	  This	  was	  completely	  within	  her	  
control.	  This	  way	  she	  could	  exercise	  her	  autonomy	  without	  compelling	  the	  physician	  to	  
violate	  the	  law.	  
	  
Nonmaleficence:	  ‘First,	  do	  no	  harm’	  is	  the	  bedrock	  of	  medical	  ethics,	  sine	  qua	  non	  that	  
guides	  the	  work	  of	  all	  healthcare	  providers.	  In	  every	  situation,	  healthcare	  providers	  should	  
avoid	  causing	  harm	  to	  their	  patients	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2013).	  Granted	  that	  some	  
treatments	  may	  cause	  some	  harm	  thus	  the	  requirement	  is	  that	  the	  treatment	  should	  not	  be	  
disproportionate	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  treatment.	  We	  assume	  that	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  
are	  suffering.	  But	  is	  their	  suffering	  so	  unbearable	  that	  death	  is	  the	  solution?	  Even	  if	  there	  
are	  situations	  in	  which	  some	  people	  suffer	  a	  lot	  because	  they	  are	  neglected	  and	  have	  no	  
hope	  to	  improve	  their	  abysmal	  situation,	  enlarging	  the	  scope	  of	  medicine	  to	  end	  the	  life	  of	  
such	  people	  may	  entail	  disproportionate	  harms.	  	  
	  
Beneficence:	  The	  autonomy	  of	  the	  person	  is	  important.	  Not	  harming	  others	  is	  a	  professional	  
value	  of	  medicine.	  Beneficence	  dictates	  that	  health	  providers	  contribute	  positively	  to	  the	  





friendship	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2013).	  Healthcare	  providers	  should	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  benefits	  and	  risks	  of	  their	  decisions.	  They	  should	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  benefits	  the	  patient.	  
They	  must	  strive	  to	  improve	  their	  patient’s	  health,	  to	  do	  the	  most	  good	  for	  the	  patient	  in	  
every	  situation.	  Granted	  that	  what	  is	  good	  for	  one	  patient	  may	  not	  be	  good	  for	  another,	  
thus	  each	  situation	  should	  be	  considered	  individually.	  Those	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  are	  not	  
interested	  in	  efforts	  to	  improve	  their	  health	  condition.	  But	  beneficence	  requires	  that	  
physicians	  will	  exhaust	  all	  treatment	  options	  which	  do	  not	  impose	  disproportionate	  burden	  
and	  which	  have	  not	  been	  refused	  by	  the	  patient.	  Beneficence	  requires	  to	  positively	  come	  to	  
those	  people	  aid.	  Whether	  kindness	  and	  mercy	  require	  ending	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  are	  
‘tired’	  of	  living	  is	  an	  open	  question	  but	  this	  conduct	  should	  always	  be	  the	  last	  resort.	  
	  
Dignity:	  The	  term	  ‘dignity’	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  Latin	  noun	  dignitas,	  which	  means:	  (a)	  
worthiness,	  merit;	  (b)	  greatness,	  authority;	  and	  (c)	  value,	  excellence.	  The	  noun	  is	  cognate	  
with	  the	  adjective	  dignus	  (worthy),	  from	  the	  Sanskrit	  root	  dic	  and	  the	  Greek	  root	  deik,	  which	  
have	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘bringing	  to	  light,’	  ‘showing,’	  or	  ‘pointing	  out’	  (Lowental	  	  1984;	  Bayertz	  
1996;	  Velleman	  1999;	  Cohen-­‐Almagor	  2001).	  
When	  using	  the	  phrase	  ‘death-­‐with-­‐dignity,’	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  timing	  and	  setting	  of	  death,	  i.e.,	  
patients	  should	  be	  allowed,	  whenever	  possible,	  to	  choose	  the	  time	  and	  setting	  of	  their	  
departure.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  medical	  professionals,	  patients	  should	  be	  able	  to	  control	  the	  
process	  of	  dying,	  maintaining	  autonomy	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  not	  being	  humiliated,	  perceiving	  
themselves	  with	  honour.	  The	  concept	  of	  dignity	  refers	  to	  a	  worth	  or	  value	  that	  flows	  from	  
an	  inner	  source.	  In	  this	  context	  I	  wish	  to	  distinguish	  between	  dignity	  as	  recognition	  and	  





Dignity	  as	  recognition	  is	  about	  us	  recognizing	  the	  inner	  spark	  of	  the	  soul	  that	  we	  all	  possess,	  
the	  inherent	  quality	  of	  the	  person.	  	  It	  is	  not	  given	  from	  the	  outside	  but	  rather	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  
the	  bearer	  of	  dignity.	  As	  Lawrence	  Ulrich	  (1999)	  notes,	  a	  painting	  may	  have	  value	  but	  it	  does	  
not	  have	  dignity.	  The	  value	  is	  placed	  upon	  it	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  artistic	  community	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  skill	  of	  the	  artist	  and	  the	  aesthetic	  priorities	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  value	  does	  
not	  derive	  from	  the	  painting	  itself.	  Persons,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  said	  to	  possess	  
dignity	  as	  an	  inner	  source	  of	  worth.	  Inherent	  dignity	  should	  be	  recognised	  by	  oneself	  and	  
also	  by	  others.	  If	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case,	  people	  would	  simply	  be	  the	  bearers	  of	  instrumental	  
value	  like	  all	  other	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  Instead,	  human	  beings	  are	  set	  apart	  and	  treated	  in	  
special	  ways.	  Human	  beings	  are	  precious;	  their	  lives	  are	  appreciated	  and	  should	  be	  
protected.9	  
Because	  the	  concept	  of	  dignity	  also	  relates	  to	  the	  inner	  self,	  it	  involves	  not	  only	  objective	  
but	  also	  subjective	  notions.	  It	  is	  the	  source	  from	  which	  human	  rights	  are	  derived,	  and	  it	  also	  
refers	  to	  one’s	  own	  feelings	  about	  oneself.	  To	  have	  dignity	  means	  to	  look	  at	  oneself	  with	  
self-­‐respect,	  with	  some	  sort	  of	  satisfaction.	  It	  means	  to	  feel	  human,	  not	  degraded.	  
Subjective	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  refers	  to	  how	  a	  person	  perceives	  of	  his	  or	  her	  life,	  
achievements,	  and	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  subjective	  evaluation	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  
individual’s	  self-­‐respect,	  relative	  to	  the	  abilities	  he	  or	  she	  believes	  he	  or	  she	  possesses	  
relative	  to	  peers	  and	  surroundings.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Contra	  Peter	  Singer	  1993,	  I	  am	  a	  ‘speciesist’.	  I	  believe	  first	  of	  all	  of	  my	  own	  species,	  the	  human	  race.	  Contrary	  
to	  Singer,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  very	  birth	  of	  human	  life	  is	  morally	  significant,	  something	  of	  great	  importance.	  






I	  have	  argued	  that	  we	  all	  have	  a	  right	  to	  dignity	  (Cohen-­‐Almagor	  2001,	  2013).	  Dignity	  as	  
liability	  requires	  that	  we	  all	  respect	  persons	  qua	  persons.	  People	  deserve	  to	  be	  accorded	  a	  
certain	  treatment	  from	  birth.	  We	  are	  endowed	  with	  dignity	  and	  have	  the	  right	  to	  be	  treated	  
with	  dignity.	  While	  people	  cannot	  expect	  concern	  from	  fellow	  humans,	  we	  can	  expect	  
respect	  from	  others.	  
More	  specifically	  and	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  role	  of	  physicians,	  preserving	  dignity	  means	  
helping	  patients	  to	  feel	  valuable.	  The	  preservation	  of	  one’s	  dignity	  involves,	  inter	  alia,	  
listening	  to	  the	  patients’	  complaints,	  helping	  patients	  cure	  their	  diseases,	  or	  at	  least	  
assisting	  them	  in	  controlling	  pain,	  responding	  to	  their	  distress	  and	  anxieties,	  making	  an	  
effort	  to	  relieve	  them,	  demonstrating	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  physical	  indignities	  that	  occur	  in	  
severe	  illnesses,	  making	  the	  patient	  sense	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  a	  human	  being	  and	  not	  an	  infant,	  
a	  case	  study,	  or	  worse,	  a	  body	  that	  occupies	  a	  bed	  and	  consumes	  resources.	  Maintaining	  the	  
patients’	  dignity	  requires	  physicians	  as	  well	  as	  the	  patients’	  families	  to	  help	  the	  patients	  
retain	  at	  least	  some	  of	  their	  self-­‐respect.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  secure	  dignified	  living	  in	  severe	  
health	  conditions.	  	  
The	  subjective	  feeling	  of	  loss	  of	  dignity	  is	  a	  significant	  consideration	  for	  those	  who	  request	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  (Rurup	  et	  al	  	  2005b).	  People	  who	  are	  
‘tired	  of	  living’	  come	  to	  believe	  death	  is	  their	  preferred	  option.	  They	  wait	  for	  death	  because	  
they	  have	  nothing	  to	  live	  for.	  Patients	  who	  suffer	  from	  incurable	  deadly	  disease	  have	  little	  
or	  no	  hope	  because	  present	  medicine	  cannot	  provide	  suitable	  answers.	  But	  people	  who	  ‘are	  
tired	  of	  life’	  are	  not	  in	  the	  same	  position.	  They	  do	  not	  suffer	  from	  such	  life-­‐threatening	  
diseases.	  There	  is	  some	  hope	  for	  them	  and	  they	  can	  regain	  self-­‐worth	  and	  value.	  
My	  research	  in	  eight	  countries	  (Australia,	  Belgium,	  Canada,	  Israel,	  New	  Zealand,	  The	  





meaning	  in	  their	  lives	  even	  when	  they	  are	  severely	  impaired,	  bed-­‐ridden,	  limited	  in	  
movement,	  and	  in	  constant	  need	  of	  help	  (Cohen-­‐Almagor	  2001,	  2004).	  We	  are	  talking	  about	  
a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  living’	  and	  who	  come	  to	  entertain	  the	  
option	  of	  shortening	  their	  lives.	  Many	  of	  these	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  living’	  were	  
independent,	  active	  and	  energetic.	  They	  become	  in	  their	  own	  eyes	  dependent	  upon	  others.	  
They	  reach	  the	  conclusion	  that	  their	  lives	  have	  become	  a	  burden	  to	  them	  and	  to	  the	  people	  
they	  love.	  They	  might	  lose	  their	  sense	  of	  humanity	  as	  well	  as	  their	  self-­‐respect,	  and	  this	  
might	  lead	  them	  to	  lose	  interest	  in	  life	  and	  to	  choose	  death.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  make	  them	  
resume	  the	  zeal	  for	  life.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  make	  them	  acknowledge	  the	  richness	  of	  life	  
even	  when	  the	  alternatives	  presented	  before	  them	  are	  more	  restricted	  compared	  to	  what	  
they	  used	  to	  have.	  Death	  awaits	  all	  of	  us.	  The	  medical	  profession	  should	  exhaust	  all	  avenues	  
of	  helping	  those	  people,	  aiming	  to	  accommodate	  their	  needs	  and	  to	  refill	  the	  void	  in	  their	  
lives	  before	  opting	  for	  euthanasia.	  	  
	  
Compassion:	  But	  what	  about	  those	  people	  whom	  we	  cannot	  help?	  We	  have	  tried	  
everything.	  Nothing	  helps.	  They	  suffer	  from	  some	  medical	  conditions	  that	  are	  not	  life-­‐
threatening.	  They	  may	  be	  old	  and	  lonely.	  We	  are	  unable	  to	  arrange	  sufficient	  company	  for	  
them	  and	  to	  garner	  enough	  points	  of	  interest	  to	  make	  their	  lives	  worthy	  of	  living.	  Should	  we	  
just	  ignore	  these	  people?	  
The	  virtue	  of	  compassion	  combines	  active	  regard	  for	  another’s	  welfare	  with	  an	  emotional	  
response	  of	  sympathy,	  tenderness,	  and	  discomfort	  at	  the	  other’s	  misfortune	  or	  suffering.	  It	  
is	  expressed	  in	  acts	  of	  beneficence	  that	  aim	  to	  alleviate	  suffering.	  Indeed,	  the	  principles	  of	  





reasons	  for	  recognizing	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  physician-­‐assisted	  death	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  
2013).	  
Calman	  (2004)	  was	  unable	  to	  assist	  Sarah.	  As	  he	  advised	  her	  to	  stop	  taking	  her	  medication	  
he	  reassured	  her	  that,	  should	  she	  become	  uncomfortable	  or	  filled	  with	  fluid	  from	  heart	  
failure,	  he	  would	  prescribe	  a	  pain	  medication	  to	  take	  away	  the	  sensation	  of	  being	  out	  of	  
breath,	  without	  treating	  her	  heart	  failure.	  He	  promised	  to	  come	  to	  see	  her	  any	  time	  day	  or	  
night.	  Sarah	  followed	  his	  advice	  but	  continued	  living	  for	  a	  few	  more	  months,	  and	  became	  
more	  agitated	  as	  death	  failed	  to	  visit	  her	  instantly.	  She	  was	  angry	  with	  her	  physician	  who	  
felt	  deep	  remorse	  for	  his	  inability	  to	  help	  her	  as	  she	  wished.	  Calman	  (2004)	  concluded	  with	  
the	  hope	  that	  when	  his	  own	  time	  will	  come,	  his	  physician	  will	  have	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  
palliative	  care	  and	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  options,	  will	  have	  the	  courage	  to	  act	  on	  his	  behalf,	  and	  that	  
the	  legal	  situation	  will	  be	  such	  as	  to	  facilitate	  more	  merciful	  assistance	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life.	  
The	  issue	  of	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  is	  a	  ‘hard	  case’.	  The	  moral	  dilemma	  is	  real	  and	  
significant.	  I	  can	  think	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  strong-­‐willed	  people	  who	  lost	  some	  of	  their	  
capabilities,	  who	  are	  lonely,	  and	  who	  are	  trapped	  in	  their	  own	  comparative	  memories,	  recall	  
their	  previous	  times	  of	  life	  when	  they	  were	  active,	  social	  beings,	  when	  they	  had	  led	  
meaningful	  life	  with	  significant	  others	  whom	  they	  loved;	  these	  people	  lost	  the	  zeal	  for	  life,	  
do	  not	  see	  a	  way	  out	  of	  their	  situation	  and	  prefer	  death.	  We	  should	  help	  them	  to	  the	  best	  of	  
our	  abilities	  but	  I	  think	  we	  should	  be	  very	  careful	  in	  providing	  a	  licence	  to	  physicians	  to	  aid	  
their	  dying.	  Such	  people,	  in	  such	  condition	  are	  exceptional.	  The	  Belgian	  Euthanasia	  Act	  
should	  not	  be	  expanded	  to	  cater	  for	  them.	  
Having	  said	  that,	  I	  believe	  medicine	  should	  try	  to	  help	  all	  people,	  not	  only	  the	  majority	  of	  
them.	  The	  rule	  should	  be	  to	  exclude	  people	  ‘who	  are	  tired	  of	  life’	  from	  the	  rule	  that	  permits	  





Euthanasia	  Act	  yet	  again	  (in	  2014,	  the	  Act	  was	  amended	  to	  include	  children),	  I	  do	  recognize	  
that	  exceptions	  can	  be	  made.	  	  
In	  the	  next	  section	  below	  I	  will	  make	  some	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  to	  accommodate	  
exceptions.	  I	  oppose	  expanding	  the	  law	  yet	  again	  because	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  build	  a	  policy	  
that	  will	  keep	  shifting	  as	  individual	  situations	  present	  themselves.	  Furthermore,	  to	  honour	  
death	  requests	  because	  people	  are	  ‘fed	  up	  with	  life’	  is	  a	  dangerous	  move.	  People	  who	  
experience	  mental,	  physical	  or	  existential	  tiredness	  and	  who	  request	  death	  should	  receive	  
proper	  psychological	  counselling,	  not	  lethal	  medication.	  They	  should	  receive	  recognition,	  a	  
caring	  treatment,	  respect	  and	  concern	  that	  could	  potentially	  renew	  their	  zeal	  for	  life.	  
Judging	  from	  past	  	  experience	  ,	  and	  observing	  the	  Belgian	  tendency	  to	  widen	  the	  circle	  of	  
eligibility	  of	  euthanasia	  beyond	  the	  2002	  Euthanasia	  Act,	  there	  is	  a	  considerable	  danger	  that	  
if	  being	  fed	  up	  with	  life	  becomes	  a	  legitimate	  consideration	  for	  ending	  life,	  otherwise	  
healthy	  people	  who	  have	  just	  been	  separated	  from	  their	  spouses,	  married	  people	  who	  are	  
grieving	  over	  the	  death	  of	  their	  spouse	  and	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  carry	  on,	  people	  who	  lost	  their	  
jobs,	  parents	  who	  have	  lost	  a	  child,	  among	  others,	  may	  appeal	  to	  have	  euthanasia.	  Debate	  
will	  ensue,	  pressure	  will	  mount	  on	  Parliament,	  some	  legislatures	  and	  physicians	  will	  argue	  
for	  listening	  to	  such	  appeals,	  and	  the	  permissive	  euthanasia	  culture	  in	  Belgium	  might	  
seriously	  entertain	  further	  expansion	  of	  the	  Euthanasia	  Act.	  Society	  and	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  
practitioners	  are	  better	  off	  refraining	  from	  engagement	  with	  such	  requests.	  	  
	  
Professional	  Integrity:	  All	  the	  above	  considerations	  directly	  relate	  to	  those	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  
life’	  and	  ask	  physician’s	  aid-­‐in-­‐dying.	  However,	  I	  wish	  to	  highlight	  another	  consideration	  that	  
seems	  to	  be	  of	  important	  relevance.	  This	  consideration	  refers	  to	  the	  coherent	  integration	  of	  





standards	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  maintaining	  	  trust	  between	  physicians	  and	  those	  who	  are	  
dependent	  on	  them.	  	  
The	  relationships	  between	  physician	  and	  patient	  are	  not	  equal.	  The	  physician	  is	  usually	  
situated	  in	  a	  power	  position	  above	  the	  patient.	  The	  physician	  has	  authority	  and	  a	  position	  to	  
decide	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  patient.	  Thus	  power	  should	  be	  exercised	  judicially	  and	  carefully.	  We	  
know	  that	  power	  can	  be	  used	  and	  abused.	  While	  most	  physicians	  will	  use	  the	  power	  granted	  
to	  them	  sensibly,	  some	  might	  either	  lack	  the	  necessary	  discretion	  or	  	  would	  not	  always	  act	  
with	  utmost	  caution.	  Physicians	  should	  be	  the	  first	  to	  acknowledge	  this	  possibility.	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interests	  not	  to	  open	  the	  door	  to	  procedures	  that	  might	  increase	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  abuse.	  Enlarging	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  law	  to	  include	  euthanasia	  for	  people	  who	  
are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  might	  pejoratively	  affect	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  This	  might	  
‘rock	  the	  boat’	  and	  undermine	  trust	  between	  physicians	  and	  others.	  The	  sensible	  thing	  is	  to	  
continue	  speaking	  about	  ‘patients’	  than	  about	  ‘people’	  at	  large.	  
Moral	  dilemmas	  are	  difficult	  to	  resolve.	  Often	  their	  solution	  is	  not	  perfect.	  Compromises	  are	  
sought	  where	  we	  weigh	  each	  option’s	  benefits	  and	  risks.	  Here	  the	  risks	  are	  too	  weighty.	  
Medical	  professionals	  must	  set	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  risk	  that	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  assume.	  
Beyond	  that	  level,	  decisions	  should	  be	  optional	  rather	  than	  obligatory.	  This	  ‘level	  drawing’	  is	  
difficult	  and	  it	  may	  be	  contested	  as	  societal	  norms	  are	  different	  from	  one	  country	  to	  
another	  (for	  instance,	  Dutch	  and	  Belgian	  societal	  norms	  regarding	  euthanasia	  are	  different	  
from	  the	  norms	  in	  Britain	  and	  in	  Israel),	  societal	  and	  medical-­‐professional	  norms	  are	  in	  flux	  
and	  they	  do	  not	  always	  exist	  in	  harmony	  (in	  Britain,	  polls	  show	  that	  82%	  of	  the	  public	  back	  
assisted	  dying	  but	  the	  British	  Medical	  Association	  opposes	  all	  forms	  of	  assisted	  dying),10	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





technology	  may	  introduce	  new	  standards.	  At	  present,	  medical	  professional	  standards	  should	  
not	  include	  euthanasia	  for	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’.	  If	  physicians	  did	  terminate	  lives	  of	  
people	  who	  are	  not	  suffering	  from	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  disease,	  this	  would	  change	  the	  raison	  
d'être	  of	  the	  profession	  and	  might	  endanger	  lives	  of	  many	  more	  elderly	  (or	  younger),	  
vulnerable	  people	  who	  wish	  to	  live.	  The	  culture	  of	  medicine	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  beneficence	  
should	  not	  include	  death	  as	  a	  way	  for	  improving	  people’s	  health.	  	  
	  
Suggestions	  for	  Improvement	  
The	  legal	  guidelines	  are	  there	  to	  protect	  and	  to	  provide	  control.	  The	  Van	  Esbeen	  case	  was	  
used	  by	  euthanasia	  supporters	  in	  Belgium	  to	  undermine	  the	  guidelines	  and	  to	  enlarge	  the	  
scope	  of	  euthanasia.	  This	  enthusiasm	  opens	  the	  door	  wider	  for	  abuse.	  A	  fine	  line	  
distinguishes	  between	  ethical	  decisions	  regarding	  a	  specific	  case,	  and	  policy	  making.	  The	  law	  
is	  not	  designed	  to	  tailor	  each	  and	  every	  scenario	  and	  incident.	  We	  have	  courts	  to	  decide	  on	  
specific	  cases,	  whether	  they	  have	  standing	  and	  whether	  they	  are	  justified.	  However,	  courts	  
are	  often	  slow	  and	  expensive.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  suggested	  to	  address	  this	  moral	  dilemma	  by	  putting	  
in	  place	  specific	  regulations.	  The	  regulations	  would	  require	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  ad	  hoc	  
committee	  for	  each	  and	  every	  euthanasia	  request	  made	  by	  people	  who	  are	  ‘tired	  of	  life’.	  
The	  ad	  hoc	  committee	  would	  include	  three	  senior	  experts	  in	  the	  relevant	  fields	  of	  medicine	  
that	  concern	  the	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  applicant.	  The	  committee	  should	  also	  include	  a	  lawyer	  and	  a	  
public	  representative,	  possibly	  an	  ethicist.	  The	  ad	  hoc	  committee	  will	  consider	  all	  the	  
aspects	  of	  the	  petition,	  meet	  with	  the	  applicant	  twice	  in	  a	  span	  of	  several	  weeks,	  and	  make	  
a	  decision	  whether	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  law	  should	  be	  made.	  This	  procedure	  of	  allowing	  
exceptions	  rather	  than	  enlarging	  the	  law	  seems	  to	  me	  more	  sensible	  and	  signals	  that	  the	  





autonomy	  of	  the	  person,	  beneficence,	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  person,	  care	  or	  compassion	  may	  
persuade	  physicians	  to	  provide	  aid	  in	  dying.	  	  
In	  September	  2014,	  an	  elderly	  husband	  and	  wife	  from	  Brussels	  Francis,	  89,	  and	  Anne,	  86	  
revealed	  their	  plans	  to	  die	  by	  assisted	  suicide.	  Both	  were	  not	  terminally	  ill,	  but	  they	  feared	  
loneliness	  if	  one	  died	  before	  the	  other.	  Francis	  said:	  ‘We	  want	  to	  go	  together	  because	  we	  
both	  fear	  for	  the	  future...	  It	  is	  as	  simple	  as	  this	  –	  we	  are	  afraid	  of	  what	  lies	  ahead’	  (Roberts	  
2014).11	  
Fearing	  for	  the	  future	  is	  natural.	  We	  all	  have	  some	  fears	  regarding	  the	  future.	  Fearing	  for	  the	  
future	  in	  an	  old	  age	  is	  understandable.	  Old	  people	  are	  more	  vulnerable,	  less	  secure.	  They	  
feel	  that	  their	  journey	  has	  come	  to	  an	  end,	  and	  that	  their	  lives	  matter	  less.	  Some	  of	  them	  
lost	  their	  viability,	  their	  energy.	  Some	  feel	  their	  contribution	  to	  society	  and	  to	  their	  loved	  
ones	  is	  diminished.	  But	  if	  they	  are	  provided	  with	  the	  assurance	  that	  their	  lives	  do	  matter,	  
that	  people	  around	  them	  are	  still	  enjoying	  their	  company,	  that	  they	  are	  important	  to	  them,	  
then	  they	  may	  reconsider	  their	  position.	  As	  most	  people	  wish	  to	  continue	  living,	  my	  
assumption	  is	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  rekindle	  the	  urge	  to	  live.	  What	  we	  need	  is	  to	  reassure	  old	  
people	  that	  they	  are	  appreciated,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  time	  for	  payback:	  it	  is	  time	  for	  their	  loved	  
ones	  to	  reward	  them	  for	  many	  years	  of	  caring	  that	  they	  gave	  for	  their	  family.	  If	  elderly	  
people	  do	  not	  receive	  this	  kind	  of	  support	  from	  their	  family,	  then	  we	  as	  a	  society	  should	  
strive	  to	  grant	  them	  such	  support,	  making	  them	  feel	  valuable	  not	  vulnerable,	  precious	  not	  
obsolete.	  With	  the	  supporting	  environment,	  the	  attraction	  of	  death	  would	  cease	  to	  exist.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  One	  editor	  remarked:	  The	  issue	  of	  a	  double	  assisted	  suicide/euthanasia	  raises	  questions	  of	  coercion	  or	  
influence.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  double	  suicides	  it	  seems	  that,	  typically,	  it	  is	  the	  man	  who	  takes	  the	  lead.	  	  Where	  one	  
has	  a	  terminal	  illness	  and	  the	  other	  does	  not	  (but	  is	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	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  or	  afraid	  of	  bereavement)	  the	  question	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Some	  people	  are	  feeling	  trapped	  in	  their	  present	  situation.	  They	  no	  longer	  see	  the	  candle	  
that	  lights	  their	  lives.	  Life	  lost	  its	  meaning	  for	  them.	  They	  want	  a	  way	  out.	  Offering	  death	  as	  
solace	  is	  relatively	  easy	  and	  far	  less	  demanding	  than	  investing	  in	  patients’	  time	  and	  
resources.	  Such	  an	  investment	  is	  what	  we	  should	  opt	  for	  as	  warranted	  by	  humane	  and	  
compassionate	  medicine	  that	  endorses	  the	  values	  of	  beneficence,	  justice,	  non-­‐maleficence,	  
and	  enabling	  patients	  to	  make	  reasoned	  informed	  choices	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2013)	  
where	  death	  might	  be	  only	  one	  of	  the	  available	  choices,	  and	  the	  very	  last	  act	  after	  carefully	  
exhausting	  all	  other	  alternatives.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  involve	  palliative	  care	  consultants	  to	  treat	  people	  who	  find	  life	  too	  
difficult	  to	  bear	  (Bernheim	  et	  al	  2008;	  Kuin	  et	  al	  2004;	  Cohen-­‐Almagor	  2002,	  2004,	  2015).	  
Being	  “tired	  of	  life”	  is	  not	  a	  disease.	  It	  is	  a	  mental	  state.	  It	  can	  be	  addressed	  with	  
comprehensive	  care	  that	  seeks	  to	  improve	  the	  patient’s	  mental,	  spiritual	  and	  physical	  
condition.	  What	  is	  suggested	  is	  combined	  efforts	  of	  palliative	  care	  and	  involving	  the	  
patient’s	  loved	  ones	  in	  treatment.	  Palliative	  care	  means	  a	  holistic	  treatment	  that	  is	  designed	  
to	  help	  individuals	  resume	  their	  will	  to	  live,	  helping	  them	  to	  rediscover	  meaning	  in	  life.	  
Palliative	  care	  aims	  to	  relieve	  suffering	  and	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  through	  specific	  
knowledge	  and	  skills,	  including	  communication	  skills;	  management	  of	  pain	  and	  other	  
symptoms;	  psychosocial,	  spiritual,	  and	  bereavement	  support;	  and	  coordination	  of	  an	  array	  
of	  medical	  and	  social	  services	  (Morrison	  &	  Meier	  2004;	  Sampson	  et	  al	  2014).12	  It	  is	  
suggested	  that	  all	  general	  practitioners	  in	  Belgium	  should	  all	  undergo	  such	  training.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






More	  than	  a	  decade	  ago,	  the	  Dutch	  Supreme	  Court	  considered	  the	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  reasoning	  
for	  euthanasia.	  The	  Netherlands	  has	  had	  long	  experience	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  euthanasia	  
and	  in	  many	  respects	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  those	  who	  pushed	  for	  such	  legislation	  in	  Belgium.	  In	  
a	  landmark	  decision,	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  physicians	  may	  not	  perform	  euthanasia	  or	  help	  
with	  suicide	  unless	  the	  request	  comes	  from	  a	  patient	  suffering	  from	  a	  medically	  classifiable	  
physical	  or	  psychiatric	  sickness	  or	  disorder.	  Merely	  being	  ‘tired	  of	  life’	  cannot	  serve	  as	  a	  
basis	  for	  physicians	  to	  grant	  euthanasia	  (Sheldon	  2003).	  	  
The	  liberal	  state	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  the	  vulnerable.	  Protecting	  the	  vulnerable	  
means	  caring	  for	  them.	  The	  Belgians	  are	  researching	  the	  way	  their	  dying	  patients	  are	  being	  
handled	  in	  a	  medical	  context.	  Their	  culture	  of	  self-­‐searching	  is	  certainly	  necessary.	  This	  issue	  
should	  be	  put	  on	  public	  agenda	  and	  open	  for	  debate,	  examining	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  each	  
and	  every	  choice	  of	  conduct.	  
The	  Belgian	  Euthanasia	  Act	  was	  passed	  only	  in	  2002,	  and	  the	  country	  is	  still	  in	  the	  early	  
learning	  stages	  (Cohen-­‐Almagor	  2009).	  We	  can	  hope	  that	  the	  Belgians	  learn	  from	  their	  
experience	  and	  will	  devise	  ways	  to	  address	  the	  concerns.	  Having	  said	  that,	  looking	  at	  the	  
short	  history	  of	  the	  euthanasia	  laws,	  policy	  and	  practice,	  in	  Belgium	  and	  also	  in	  the	  
Netherlands	  may	  lead	  us	  to	  think	  that	  there	  is	  something	  intoxicating	  about	  the	  practice	  
that	  blinds	  the	  eyes	  of	  decision-­‐makers,	  leading	  them	  to	  press	  forward	  towards	  further	  end-­‐
of-­‐life	  practices	  without	  paying	  ample	  attention	  to	  caution.	  The	  scope	  of	  tolerance	  towards	  
the	  practice	  of	  euthanasia	  is	  thereby	  enlarged	  so	  that	  yesterday’s	  red	  light	  becomes	  
obsolete	  today.	  As	  the	  restrictions	  are	  removed,	  practitioners	  and	  law-­‐makers	  are	  already	  
debating	  the	  next	  	  step	  and	  the	  additional	  groups	  to	  be	  included	  within	  the	  more	  liberal	  





careful	  study,	  together	  with	  an	  accumulation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  data,	  addressing	  the	  above	  
concerns,	  thereby	  learning	  from	  mistakes	  and	  attempting	  to	  correct	  them	  before	  rushing	  to	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